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ARGUMENT 
I. A DETERMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF AN UNDERLYING 
CONTRACT IS INAPPLICABLE AND BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A 
WRONGFUL LIEN INQUIRY UNDER THE WRONGFUL LIEN ACT. 
As briefed in Charles D. Pugh's (hereinafter "Pugh") initial brief, an inquiry of the 
validity of an underlying contract to a lien is not applicable when determining the 
validity of a lien under the Wrongful Lien Act. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. 
Richard Pratt's (hereinafter "Pratt") contentions that the liens are wrongful because of 
Pugh's repudiation and an alleged no "meeting of the minds," are not only irrelevant 
under the Wrongful Lien Act, but fail because of Pratt's own fraud. 
A, The lower court inappropriately exceeded its scope of review when it 
made a finding concerning the validity of the parties contract while the 
matter was already pending in another court and because it is not 
determinative of a wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Act 
The lower court inappropriately exceeded its scope of review when it entered 
findings on the validity of the parties contract despite it being litigated in a companion 
case, Fourth District Court case number 060101257 (hereinafter "companion case"). (R. 
48). Wrongful lien actions under the Wrongful Lien act are summary proceedings, 
expedited in nature, and limited in scope. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-6(4). They do not 
extend beyond a determination of whether a lien is wrongful at the time of its filing. Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). The ongoing companion case however, deals with the 
comprehensive legal issues between the parties, including, among others, the validity of 
the contracts. The lower court made this finding despite no contractual issues being 
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plead in Pratt's Petition for Lien Nullification. (R. 855). 
The Lower Court found that the underlying contract, upon which the liens were 
based, failed at their inception, without addressing the fact that Pugh and his business 
partners released $500,000 to Pratt and his business partners in reliance upon trust deeds 
being placed on Pratt's property for $500,000. 
Furthermore, the lower court found that because of Pugh's repudiation of one of 
his underlying contracts, the lien was wrongful, yet never took into account Pratt and his 
business partner's fraudulent actions. Pugh only repudiated his contract with Pratt's 
business partners after discovering that he had been coerced and manipulated, and that 
Pugh's business partners already had a valid executed contract. At that same time, Pugh 
ratified his support of his business partner's extant contract. 
Later, Pugh discovered that Pratt had fraudulently changed his contract with Pugh 
after Pugh had signed it and faxed it to the title company. Incredulously, Pratt has used 
the fact that he changed the contracts after Pugh signed them to claim there was no 
"meeting of the minds" because the contracts are materially different do to Pratt's 
changes. 
Even more incredulous is that Pratt and his business partners have not returned the 
$500,000.00 they took from Pugh and his business partners even though Pratt claims 
there was no "meeting of the minds" and that the contracts failed at their inception. Pratt 
is attempting to keep the money released to him upon the assumption of security by his 
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property and then have the Trust Deeds released on his properties by claiming their was 
no "meeting of minds." 
B. Pratt's argument that there was no "meeting of the minds" in the 
underlying contract is unsupported, brought in bad faith, and 
irrelevant when determining if a lien is wrongful under the Wrongful 
Lien Act. 
Pratt's contention that there was no "meeting of the minds" is not only irrelevant 
to a determination of wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Act, but disingenuous and 
brought in bad faith. Pratt's entire basis for his argument that there was no "meeting of 
the minds" between the parties is that "Mr. Pugh has admitted there was no meeting of 
the minds in the agreement.. . ." (See Brief of Appellee, pg 11). This contention is 
wholly unfounded. Pratt simply fabricates a statement of Pugh and fails to even cite to 
the record or any testimony of Pugh stating such. To make an argument founded solely 
on fabricated statements is inappropriate and exhibits blatant bad faith. 
C. Pugh's repudiation of the Sovren contract is irrelevant when 
determining if a lien is wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act, 
Pratt again attempts to circumvent the Wrongful Lien Act and state that because 
Pugh attempted to repudiate one of the contracts between the parties, the lien must 
therefore be released. Pratt cites to Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003) as his 
controlling authority for this conclusion. However, Flake is not relevant to the case at 
hand. In Flake, the Utah Supreme Court was not determining the validity of the lis 
pendens under the Wrongful Lien Act, but was reviewing whether Mrs. Flake gave 
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proper notice of the lien as required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-12-102. Id at 600. The 
Court in that case determined that notice was given and that damages should not be 
awarded. Id. A lis pendens is treated differently under the Wrongful Lien Act, as it is 
"authorized pursuant to statute," and is only allowed when there is an active case 
involving issues with the properly. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). 
In this case, the trust deeds at issue in this appeal were recorded on Pratt's 
property, by Pratt, after the execution of contracts by Pratt and Pugh, and after the release 
of $500,000 by Pugh and his business partners' to Pratt and his business partners. Pugh 
later discovered that Pratt fraudulently and materially altered one of the contracts after 
Pugh had signed it. Following these occurrences a law suit was filed, by Pugh's 
business partners, addressing the fraud and contractual issues involving the parties. Pratt 
and his business partners have spent Pugh and his business partners $500,000 and have 
not complied with the terms of the parties agreement. Despite such heinous behavior, 
Pratt is attempting to circumvent liability in the companion case by filing this Writ for 
Lien Nullification on grounds of repudiation, all the while not acknowledging: 1) his 
fraud that precipitated the repudiation, 2) the fact that there are other contracts between 
the parties, and 3) that he and his business partners have spent $500,000 of Pugh and his 
business partners funds without any repayment. It would not only be inappropriate to 
disregard the plain language of the Wrongful Lien Act, but unjust to remove a lien, 
properly authorized and recorded, and allow $500,000 spent by Pugh and his business 
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partners to become unsecured. 
D. The Court should only look to the Wrongful Lien Act to determine the 
validity of the liens recorded in this case. 
As propounded in Pugh's initial brief, the Utah Supreme Court has long held that 
"(w)here statutory language is plain and unambiguous , this Court will not look beyond 
the same to divine legislative intent." Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989). The Court in that case continued, stating that it is "guided by the rule that a 
statute should generally be construed according to its plain language." Id. In fact, 
neither appellant nor appellee contend that the Wrongful Lien Statute is ambiguous. The 
Wrongful Lien Act is unambiguous with regard to what constitutes a wrongful lien and 
what a court should consider when determining if a lien is wrongful. 
Pratt quickly addresses the plain language of the Wrongful Lien Act in his brief. 
However, Pratt simply cites the Wrongful Lien Act and then makes a conclusory 
statement that the lien is "wrongful" as it was not "signed by or authorized pursuant to 
document signed by the owner of the real property." (See Brief of Appellee, pg 14). 
Following this conclusory statement, Pratt mentions the filing of lis pendens by Pugh. Id. 
Pratt fails to mention that the lis pendens were filed in conjunction with the companion 
case and were not before the lower court or at issue in the present appeal. Id. Not only 
does Pratt fail to state facts to support his unfounded statement, but proceeded to confuse 
and misdirect the Court's inquiry by arguing a lis pendens claim not at issue in this case. 
Moreover, after making a quick baseless argument for why the lien is wrongful 
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under the Wrongful Lien Statute, Pratt asks the court to apply general contract principles 
in determining whether the liens are wrongful. Pratt attempts to bolster this argument 
citing a footnote contained in Jack B. Parson Cos. v. Nield, 751 P2.d 1131 (Utah 1988) 
which, according to Pratt, states that "if the contract underlying the placement of the liens 
was invalid, then placement of the liens was similarly invalid because such placement 
was 'wrongful from inception.'" (See Brief of Appellee, pg 14). However, when 
reviewing footnote 1 contained in Parsons, no such statement is made by the Court. Jack 
B. Parsons Cos. v. Nield, at nl. As the Parsons case began prior to the enactment of the 
Wrongful Lien Act, the Utah Supreme Court simply discusses the possible application of 
the Wrongful Lien Act in footnote 1. Id. The Court, however, does not make any 
statement as proffered by Pratt. Id. 
Furthermore, Pratt cites Centennial Inv. Co., LLC v. Nuttall, 171 P.3d 458 (Utah 
2007), in another attempt to support his argument that contract theory should be applied 
instead of the Wrongful Lien Act. However, in that case, unlike in this action, the buyer 
filed a "notice of interest" on the seller's property without any signed document 
authorizing him to do so, or it being authorized by statute. Id at 461. Thus, despite 
Pratt's contention, the Court in Centennial never addressed the underlying contract as the 
basis for the lien being wrongful, but only addressed whether the "notice of interest" was 
"authorized by statute." Id. 
Clearly, the trust deeds recorded on Pratt's property are not wrongful liens under 
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the Wrongful Lien Act. Pratt signed a security agreement authorizing his two properties 
to be encumbered, signed Settlement Statements for each property, and gave sworn 
testimony that he allowed the properties to be encumbered. (R. 4, 112, 511) The statute is 
unambiguous and the Court should not look to contract principle to determine if a lien is 
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act. Pratt should not be allowed to keep Pugh and 
his business partners' money, released to him upon the assumption of security by his 
property, and then have the Trust Deeds released on his properties by claiming there was 
no "meeting of minds" as a result of his fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's granting 
of summary judgment in favor of the Petitioner be overturned, that judgment be entered 
on behalf of the Respondent holding the liens valid, and Respondent be awarded lower 
court and appellate costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
DATED this day of March, 2010. 
JAMES C. HASKINS 
GRAHAM J. HASKINS 
Attorneys for Charles Pugh 
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